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Adversarial Learning for Image Forensics Deep
Matching with Atrous Convolution
Yaqi Liu, Xianfeng Zhao, Xiaobin Zhu, and Yun Cao
Abstract—Constrained image splicing detection and localiza-
tion (CISDL) is a newly proposed challenging task for image
forensics, which investigates two input suspected images and
identifies whether one image has suspected regions pasted from
the other. In this paper, we propose a novel adversarial learning
framework to train the deep matching network for CISDL. Our
framework mainly consists of three building blocks: 1) the deep
matching network based on atrous convolution (DMAC) aims
to generate two high-quality candidate masks which indicate
the suspected regions of the two input images, 2) the detection
network is designed to rectify inconsistencies between the two
corresponding candidate masks, 3) the discriminative network
drives the DMAC network to produce masks that are hard to
distinguish from ground-truth ones. In DMAC, atrous convolu-
tion is adopted to extract features with rich spatial information,
the correlation layer based on the skip architecture is proposed to
capture hierarchical features, and atrous spatial pyramid pooling
is constructed to localize tampered regions at multiple scales.
The detection network and the discriminative network act as
the losses with auxiliary parameters to supervise the training of
DMAC in an adversarial way. Extensive experiments, conducted
on 21 generated testing sets and two public datasets, demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed framework and the superior
performance of DMAC.
Index Terms—Image forensics, constrained image splicing
detection and localization, adversarial learning, deep matching,
atrous convolution.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the flourish of mobile devices and social networks,it is easy to take photos and share them on the networks
at anytime and anywhere. Consequently, vicious forgers can
efficiently spread rumours using the forged images which
can be well produced by sophisticated image editing tools.
Thus, image forgery is becoming a rampant problem [1]. To
overcome this problem, image forensics techniques, which aim
at finding tampered traces in digital images, have attracted
great attention in research and industry [2].
The majority of image forensics algorithms inspect the sin-
gle investigated image, and attempt to find out the high-level
or low-level inconsistencies caused by image manipulations
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Fig. 1. The visual presentation of the constrained image splicing detection
and localization (CISDL) task. Suspected regions are shown in white.
[3]. A variety of high-level features (e.g., the consistency of
shadows and lighting [4], the phenomenon of motion blur [5],
traces of perspective and geometry [6], etc.) and low-level
signatures (e.g., the photo-response nonuniformity noise [7],
the artifacts of color filter array [8], the JPEG coding traces
[9], steganalysis features [10], copy-move forgery detection
[11], etc.) have been extensively studied in the past decades.
Although, tremendous progress has been made, the state-of-
the-art image forensics methods cannot well accommodate
to real applications. The majority of existing works require
strong assumptions, and are not robust to post compression
and camera diversities [1]–[3]. In addition, these methods
simply find out tampered images or regions in absence of
auxiliary evidences, e.g. the source of tampered regions, the
specific tampering process, etc., while the auxiliary evidences
can provide more clues and make the results more convincing.
The task of constrained image splicing detection and local-
ization (CISDL) [1] aims to investigate two suspected images,
and detect if a region of one image has been spliced into the
other image. Explicitly, as shown in Fig. 1, given the probe
image P and a potential donor image D, the objective is to
detect if a region of D has been spliced into P, if so, provide
the mask images Pm and Dm indicating the region(s) of P
that were spliced from D and the region(s) of D that were
spliced into P. CISDL is one of the four image forensics
tasks in the Media Forensics Challenge [12], and plays an
important role in producing an image phylogeny graph [13].
Wu et al. proposed the pioneer approach for CISDL, namely
Deep Matching and Validation Network (DMVN) [1], which
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Fig. 2. Overview of the proposed adversarial learning framework for the CISDL task. The masks in the light orange boxes are the outputs of DMAC and
the main inputs of the detection network and the discriminative network. The inputs of (b) and (c) contain gray arrows and operators which mean that the
ground-truth pairs are only the inputs during optimizing the detection network and the discriminative network themselves.
can achieve good detection performance on CASIA [14] and
Nimble 2017 datasets [15]. However, the localization perfor-
mance has not been quantitatively evaluated, and was only
illustrated by the visual comparisons. DMVN only compares
high-level low-resolution feature maps of VGG [16], resulting
in the insufficient ability to detect accurate boundaries and
find small regions. In addition, the label variables are predicted
locally by convolution filters with restricted field-of-views, the
long-range information is difficult to be exploited and regions
at multiple scales are hard to be handled.
To tackle above-mentioned problems, a newly designed
adversarial learning framework for CISDL is proposed. As
shown in Fig. 2, the proposed framework is composed of
three building blocks: the deep matching network based on
atrous convolution (DMAC), the detection network and the
discriminative network. In DMAC, three modules, i.e. feature
extraction based on atrous convolution, the correlation layer
based on the skip architecture, and atrous spatial pyramid
pooling (ASPP) are designed and assembled to tackle the
problems caused by the low-resolution feature maps, primitive
feature comparisons and target regions at multiple scales
[17]–[19], respectively. Then the proposed DMAC network,
detection network and discriminative network are optimized in
an adversarial way. The consideration is that the label variables
output by ASPP are predicted locally with restricted field-
of-views, and even the two generated masks are predicted
independently, without considering their relations. Thus, we
propose a detection network based on a variant form of
adversarial learning to correct the inconsistencies between
the two generated masks. Ground-truth masks are integrated
to supervise the training of the detection network and avoid
overfitting the incorrect distribution of generated masks. Then,
we propose to construct a discriminative network which drives
DMAC to approximate the distribution of ground-truth masks
and produce masks that cannot be distinguished from ground-
truth ones, so that it can correct inconsistencies between
generated masks and ground-truth masks. Thus, the final loss
function of our framework is composed of three parts, namely,
the spatial cross entropy loss, the detection loss and the
discriminative loss. Note that both the detection network and
the discriminative network are only utilized in the adversarial
training phase.
In summary, the main contributions of our work are four-
fold: (1) A novel adversarial learning framework is proposed
for the CISDL task, and three building blocks are designed and
optimized in an adversarial way. (2) A novel fundamental deep
3matching network named DMAC is proposed, in which atrous
convolution, the correlation layer with the skip architecture
and ASPP are designed to enrich spatial information, leverage
hierarchal features and handle multi-scale regions. (3) A well-
designed training set is automatically generated under strong
restrictions, and 21 testing sets under different restrictions
are generated to testify the localization performance and the
robustness against different transformations. The generation
principles are illustrated in detail, and the datasets will be
released for future public research use. (4) The proposed
framework brings substantial improvements and achieve su-
perior performance against the state-of-the-arts, according to
the criterions on both localization and detection.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section II, we
discuss related work. In Section III, we elaborate the pro-
posed approach. In Section IV, experiments are conducted to
demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed
approach. In Section V, we draw conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
CISDL is a dense matching task in nature, which is one
of the fundamental tasks in computer vision [20]. The ap-
plications of dense matching range from copy-move forgery
detection [21], 3D reconstruction [22] to image manipulation
[23] etc. In this section, we firstly introduce related works on
conventional dense matching methods and the deep learning
based dense matching methods. Then, we illustrate the related
techniques involved in our method.
Conventional dense matching is conducted by comparing
local descriptors extracted around interest points [20]–[23].
As one kind of image forensics method, the state-of-the-
art copy-move forgery detection methods also make use of
the local features comparison [24]. In the seminal work of
CISDL [1], the authors even directly compare against copy-
move forgery detection approaches for the lack of other CISDL
methods. The probe and donor images are concatenated into
one single combined image, and copy-move forgery detection
is conducted on the concatenated image. However, copy-
move forgery detection methods are still sensitive to image
compression, noises, and the luminance change, etc. [24],
[25], and the computation is time-consuming. They can not
satisfy the tough requirements of the CISDL task in which
a large number of complex images should be processed. In
[1], the authors have demonstrated that DMVN can achieve
better performance than the state-of-the-art copy-move forgery
detection methods on the CISDL task.
Recently, dense matching based on global features extracted
by Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) has been investi-
gated [26]. CNNs are trained in an end-to-end way, and can
achieve better performance than handcrafted features for the
invariance to local transformations. During the applications
in dense matching, instead of dividing the image into a set
of local patches, those methods treat the image as a whole,
and compare the high-level features extracted by CNNs. An
abundance of network architectures have been proposed for
the task of estimating inter-frame motion in video [27],
[28] or instance-level homography estimation [29]. Although
those methods attempt to find high-precision correspondences
between images, they only need to search surrounding areas
with very limited appearance variation and background clutter.
Conversely, some other methods were proposed for long-
range inexact category-level matching [26], [30], [31]. These
methods aim to find the same category of objects with similar
appearance, which are far from the CISDL task. Thus, those
state-of-the-art deep matching methods or their specialized
techniques can not be directly adopted for CISDL in which
long-range high-precision correspondences should be found.
Our approach draws on recent successes of fully con-
volutional networks and Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs). Fully convolutional networks are widely researched
in semantic segmentation. We re-architect fully convolutional
networks with atrous convolution to find long-range high-
precision correspondences, and design an adversarial learning
framework based on a multi-task loss which is motivated from
the success of GANs. In the following, we briefly introduce
the basic ideas and representative works of fully convolutional
networks and GANs.
Fully convolutional networks. Semantic segmentation
aims at giving a class label for each pixel on the image
according to its semantic meaning. The state-of-the-art se-
mantic segmentation methods mostly stem from a common
forerunner, i.e. Fully Convolutional Network (FCN) [32].
Its key insight is to build fully convolutional networks that
take input of arbitrary size and produce correspondingly-
sized output with efficient inference and learning. However,
FCN faces some inherent or even inevitable shortcomings,
e.g. the low-resolution feature maps, restricted field-of-views
and independent predictions, etc. In [32], to alleviate these
problems, the skip techniques were designed to make use
of low-level high-resolution features, and different CNNs
architectures were testified [16], [32]. The successors also
proposed some other remedial methods, e.g. atrous convolution
to keep feature maps in higher resolution [17]–[19], learnable
deconvolution operations [33] or upsampling operations [34]
to recover the spatial information. In order to deal with the
objects in different scales and break through the field-of-
views restriction, different techniques were proposed, e.g.,
the image pyramid architectures [35]–[37], spatial pyramid
pooling [19], [38], etc. Besides, some post processing tech-
niques, e.g. fully connected conditional random fields [39],
[40], were proposed to encode pixel-level pairwise similarities
and capture long range information, resulting in accurate
segmentation boundaries. Despite of the high efficiency and
effectiveness of fully convolutional networks, the techniques
to solve aforementioned problems still need further research.
Generative Adversarial Networks. GANs were originally
proposed for the basic task of image synthesis in computer
vision [41], and have achieved great success in various image
generation tasks [42]. In general, GANs take samples z
from a fixed distribution pz(z), and transform them by a
deterministic differentiable deep network g(·) to approximate
the distribution of training samples x. The distribution px(·)
over x induced by g(·) and pz(·) is intractable to evaluate,
thus an adversarial network is constructed to formulate a
kind of loss with auxiliary parameters which are not part
4of the generative model g(·). The adversarial network tries
to optimally discriminate samples from the real data and
samples from the generative network, while the generative
network g(·) is concurrently optimized to generate samples
which are hard to distinguish from the real data [41]. The
adversarial learning procedures provably drive the generative
network to approximate the distribution of the training data
[43]. Numerous loss functions [44], [45] and architectures
[46], [47] of GANs were designed to stabilize the training
and enhance the approximation capabilities of the generative
models. The adversarial learning ideas or GANs were also
adopted in semantic segmentation finetuning [48] or semi-
supervised training [49], [50], and optical flow for optimizing
short-range high-precision matching [51].
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section, we elaborate the proposed adversarial learn-
ing framework. As shown in Fig. 2, there are three building
blocks in our framework: the DMAC network, the detection
network and the discriminative network. The step-by-step
instructions are provided in the following parts.
The proposed DMAC network is mainly constituted by three
modules, namely the feature extraction module, the correlation
computation module and the mask generation module. In the
feature extraction module, atrous convolution is adopted to
enrich the spatial information of convolutional features, and
the detailed architectures are introduced in section III-A. In
the correlation computation module, the skip architecture is
designed for the hierarchical features comparison, and the
detailed computing procedures are illustrated in section III-B.
In the mask generation module, ASPP is designed to capture
multi-scale information, and is depicted in section III-C.
Then, we probe into our adversarial learning framework
by introducing the formulated multi-task loss with the cor-
responding adversarial learning procedure (section III-D), the
specific architectures of the detection network and discrimi-
native network (section III-E). The formulated novel multi-
task loss has three components: the spatial cross entropy
loss which evaluates the masks in the pixel level, the variant
adversarial form of the detection loss, and the discriminative
loss in which both the binary cross entropy loss and hinge
loss are formulated and testified. The detection loss and the
discriminative loss are computed from the detection network
and discriminative network respectively. The detection net-
work is constructed referring to the Siamese Network, and
the discriminative network adopts spectral normalization and
LeakyReLU to stabilize the adversarial training.
A. Feature Extraction with Atrous Convolution
The pooling or downsampling operations in CNNs in-
evitably reduce the spatial resolution of the output feature
maps. The pioneer work DMVN [1] utilizes feature maps
generated by the fourth convolutional block of VGG [16], and
adopts deconvolutional layers to recover the spatial informa-
tion. However, the low-resolution feature maps are still the
bottleneck for dense masks prediction, and deconvolutional
layers will increase the memory cost and time complexity.
In our work, atrous convolution is adopted to generate high-
resolution feature maps [17]–[19]. Let y[i, j] denote the output
of the atrous convolution of a 2-D input signal x[i, j], and it
can be computed as:
y[i, j] =
fl(K
2
)∑
k2=−fl(
K
2
)
fl(K
2
)∑
k1=−fl(
K
2
)
{x[i+ r · k1, j + r · k2]
× w[k1, k2]}
(1)
where w[k1, k2] denotes a filter with the size of K ×K , the
rate parameter r corresponds to the sampling stride of the input
signal, and fl(·) denotes the floor function. The special case
of rate r = 1 denotes the standard convolution.
Atrous convolution allows us to adaptively modify the field-
of-view of filters by changing the rate value without additional
parameters. Assuming that the input feature maps pass through
a downsampling layer by a factor of 2, and then are convolved
by the standard convolution filters. The resulting feature maps
are only 1/4 of the input feature maps, and the standard
filters obtain responses at only 1/4 of the image positions.
If we remove the downsampling layer and directly convolve
the input feature maps, the filters will have a smaller field-of-
view. Fortunately, we can keep the original field-of-view by
adopting the atrous convolution with rate r = 2. By utilizing
atrous convolution operations, we can generate high-resolution
feature maps, obtain all responses from the input feature
maps, and do not need additional parameters and computation.
Although the effective filter size increases, we only need to
take into account the non-zero filter values, hence both the
number of filter parameters and the number of operations per
position stay constant.
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Fig. 3. The feature extraction module architecture, “conv3” denotes the
convolution operation with the filter size of 3 × 3, “AC” denotes atrous
convolution. (a) The original VGG architecture. (b) The architecture using
atrous convolution.
5Considering the inherent advantages of atrous convolu-
tion, we adopt it as the basic operation to generate dense
high-resolution features. Similar to DMVN [1], VGG [16]
is selected as the basic architecture. As shown in Fig. 3
(a), DMVN adopts the “F4” feature maps to conduct dense
matching. In our formulation, the last two “maxpool” layers
are removed, and atrous convolution is adopted in the last
block of convolutional layers, as shown in Fig. 3 (b). In the
end, with the input image size of 256× 256, we get a set of
feature maps with the size of 32× 32.
B. Correlation Layer with The Skip Architecture
The deep feature correlation computation is a key problem
in deep matching tasks [1], [26], [28]. For some tasks [28],
they only need to compare neighbor fields, and complicated
correlation layers can be formulated. And for the long-range
correlation computation tasks [1], [26], they generally compute
the scalar product of a pair of individual descriptors at each
position. The difference between [1] and [26] is that, [26]
only measures the similarities among each position, and [1]
tries to strictly keep the spatial restriction. Referring to DMVN
[1], we also keep the spatial restriction and only extract out
meaningful correlation maps. Let fa, fb denote the d-channel
feature maps with the size of h × w, fa, fb ∈ R
h×w×d,
and fa(ia, ja) ∈ fa, fb(ib, jb) ∈ fb which denote the d-
dimensional descriptors at specific positions. The correlation
maps cab ∈ R
h×w×(h×w) contain the scalar product of a
pair of individual descriptors fa(ia, ja) and fb(ib, jb) at each
position (iab, jab, kab):
cab(iab, jab, kab) = fa(ia, ja)
T
fb(ib, jb) (2)
in which
ib = mod(ia + it, h)
jb = mod(ja + jt, w)
iab = ia, jab = ja, kab = w · it + jt
(3)
The constraints in formula (3) mean that the correlation map in
the same channel kab must satisfy the strong spatial restriction.
All the compared feature locations in the same channel kab
are under the same translation (it, jt), ia, ib, it ∈ [0, h) and
ja, jb, jt ∈ [0, w). To reduce the impact of uncorrelated
noises, the average, maximum and sorted correlation maps are
generated as:
cavgab (iab, jab, 0) =
1
h× w
∑
kab
cab(iab, jab, kab) (4)
cmaxab (iab, jab, 0) = arg max
0≤kab<(h×w)
{cab(iab, jab, kab)} (5)
csrtab (iab, jab, k) = cab(iab, jab, kt),
kt ∈ Top T index(sortkab(sum(cab(:, :, kab))))
(6)
where Top T index(·) denotes the function which selects
indexes of the top-T values (T is empirically set to 6). Finally,
we can get the output feature maps cˆab = {c
avg
ab , c
max
ab , c
srt
ab },
and cˆab ∈ R
h×w×(T+2), in which 2 dimensions are the average
and max correlation maps, and the other T dimensions are the
sorted correlation maps. For the sake of clarity, we denote the
correlation computation procedure as the function:
cˆab = Corr(fa, fb) (7)
To fully exploit the abundant information provided by
the feature extraction module, we propose to use the skip
architecture for effectively organizing the atrous convolution
and leveraging hierarchical convolutional features. As shown
in Fig. 3 (b), with the help of atrous convolution operations, we
can get three sets of feature maps f3, f4, f5 (“F3”,“F4”,“F5”
in Fig. 3 (b)) with the same w and h. Thus, three sets
of correlation feature maps can be generated based on the
feature maps f3, f4, f5, and neither upsampling operations nor
mapping functions are needed. The computation procedure of
the proposed correlation layer based on the skip architecture
can be summarized as Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1: The computation procedure of the correla-
tion layer based on the skip architecture
Input: Image Ia and Ib
Parameter: VGG AC(·)
1: f3a , f
4
a , f
5
a = VGG AC(Ia)
2: f3b , f
4
b , f
5
b = VGG AC(Ib)
3: for l = 3 to 5 do
4: cˆlab = Corr(f
l
a, f
l
b)
5: cˆlaa = Corr(f
l
a, f
l
a)
6: cˆlba = Corr(f
l
b, f
l
a)
7: cˆlbb = Corr(f
l
b, f
l
b)
8: cla = {cˆ
l
ab, cˆ
l
aa}
9: clb = {cˆ
l
ba, cˆ
l
bb}
10: end for
11: ca = {c
3
a, c
4
a, c
5
a}
12: cb = {c
3
b , c
4
b , c
5
b}
Output: Correlation maps ca and cb of Ia and Ib
C. Atrous Spatial Pyramid Pooling
Another important issue is that the tampered areas are in
different scales. To capture the information of different scales
provided by the correlation maps, Atrous Spatial Pyramid
Pooling (ASPP) [19] is constructed to generate the final masks.
As shown in Fig. 4 (a), ASPP contains multiple parallel atrous
convolutional layers with different sampling rates. So that
those atrous convolution filters have different field-of-views
(shown in different colors in Fig. 4 (a)), and can focus on
tampered regions of different scales. As shown in Fig. 4 (b),
each atrous convolutional layer with one sampling rate is
followed by a separate branch of convolutional layers, batch
normalization and ReLU layers. Then, the separate branches
are fused to generate the final masks. Referring to [19], there
is no upsampling operation with learnable parameters during
mask generation, and we simply adopt the bilinear upsampling
operation during the test time as shown in Fig. 2.
D. Adversarial Learning and Multi-Task Loss
As described above, we construct a novel deep matching
network called DMAC for CISDL. In the DMAC network,
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rate = 12
rate = 18
rate = 24
Atrous Spatial 
Pyramid Pooling
Correlation maps
(a) Multiple parallel atrous convolutional layers.
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Input dim: 48 Output dim: 96
Convolutional layer
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Input dim: 96 Output dim: 96 
Convolutional layer
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Input dim: 96 Output dim: 2
Batch normalization
ReLU
Batch normalization
ReLU
(b) The ASPP separate branch.
Fig. 4. Atrous Spatial Pyramid Pooling (ASPP).
the final label variables are predicted locally by convolution
filters with restricted filed-of-views, ignoring the long-range
information. Besides, two masks are generated in our task,
the spatial cross-entropy loss can only evaluate the quality of
each mask independently, neglecting the relationship between
the two masks. Inspired by GANs [41], we propose a novel
adversarial learning framework for our task.
Along with the spatial cross-entropy loss, we formulate
another two kinds of losses together to optimize the network
under our adversarial learning framework. The proposed multi-
task loss function is formulated as:
Ldmac = Lce + λdetL
G
det + λdisL
G
dis (8)
where Lce denotes the spatial cross entropy loss, L
G
det and
LGdis are the two adversarial learning terms generated by the
proposed detection network and the discriminative network.
Given the two investigated images I
(i)
a−ori and I
(i)
b−ori, one-
hot encoded ground truth maps Y
(i)
a and Y
(i)
b , and the deep
matching results Ŷ
(i)
a , Ŷ
(i)
b = DMAC(I
(i)
a−ori, I
(i)
b−ori), the
spatial cross-entropy loss is obtained by:
Lce = −
1
m
m∑
i=1
∑
j∈{a,b}
∑
h,w,c
Y
(i,h,w,c)
j log(Ŷ
(i,h,w,c)
j ) (9)
where m denotes the number of samples in the batch, h,w
denote the height and width of the masks, and c denotes the
class in the ground truth, in our formulation c ∈ {0, 1}. Note
that Ŷ
(i)
a , Ŷ
(i)
b are the generated masks without upsampling,
and their sizes both are 32×32 in our work. Y
(i)
a and Y
(i)
b are
also the resized ground truth masks with the size of 32× 32.
Thus, h and w are in the range of [0, 32) in formula (9).
Furthermore, in the computation of the detection network and
the discriminative network, the original images I
(i)
a−ori and
I
(i)
b−ori are also downsampled to 32×32 using average pooling.
The pooled images are denoted as I
(i)
a and I
(i)
b .
In conventional GANs [41], the discriminator D and the
generatorG play the following two-player minimax game with
value function V (D,G):
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) = E
x∼pdata(x)[logD(x)]+
E
z∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
(10)
D is trained to maximize the probability of assigning the
correct label to both training examples and samples from G,
G is trained to minimize the difference between the training
examples and generated samples.
In our task, the proposed DMAC network is treated as
the generator G, and we try to formulate a hybrid and
variant form of discriminator D. The D is composed of
two networks, namely the detection network Det(·) and the
discriminative network Dis(·). Det(·) is formulated to evaluate
the correlation between the two investigated images and the
corresponding masks. In [1], a similar validation network is
proposed to predict the matching probabilities, however, they
simply adopt the threshold masks which are almost useless
to improve the performance of masks generation. In our
work, Ŷ
(i)
a and Ŷ
(i)
b are the probability maps generated by
softmax, and the gradients are easy to propagate to optimize
DMAC. Furthermore, a variant form of adversarial learning
is designed to avoid overfitting and ensure LGdet can provide
valid gradients. Specifically, the detection loss for optimizing
the DMAC network can be formulated as:
LGdet = −
1
m
m∑
i=1
[C
(i)
ab log(Det(Ŷ
(i)
a × I
(i)
a
, Ŷ
(i)
b × I
(i)
b ))]
(11)
where × denotes the broadcastable element-wise multiplica-
tion between matrixes, C
(i)
ab denotes the class label with values
as correlated or uncorrelated. As for the training of Det(·), we
try to minimize the following loss:
LDdet = −
1
m
m∑
i=1
[C
(i)
ab log(Det(Y
(i)
a × I
(i)
a , Y
(i)
b
× I
(i)
b )) + C
(i)
ab log(Det(Ŷ
(i)
a × I
(i)
a , Ŷ
(i)
b × I
(i)
b ))]
(12)
in which the ground-truth masks {Y
(i)
a , Y
(i)
b } are integrated
to supervise the training of Det(·). The motivation is that if
Det(·) were only trained on generated masks, it might overfit
the incorrect distribution of generated masks and provide
meaningless gradients.
The discriminative network Dis(·) is similar to the tra-
ditional discriminator D in GANs, which is designed to
discriminate masks coming either from the ground truth or
the DMAC network. The only difference is that our Dis(·)
needs to process two associated input masks. The motivation
is that the final label variables in DMAC are predicted indepen-
dently, which may cause higher-order inconsistencies between
7ground truth masks and the generated masks. The adversarial
term encourages DMAC to produce masks that cannot be
distinguished from ground-truth ones by Dis(·). Dis(·) with
fully connected layers can assess the joint configuration of
many label variables, it can enforce forms of higher-order
consistency. Here, we testify two types of loss functions, the
one is the binary cross entropy loss derived from conventional
GANs [41], and the loss for DMAC(·) is computed as:
LGdis = −
1
m
m∑
i=1
∑
j∈{a,b}
log(Dis(Ŷ
(i)
j × I
(i)
j )) (13)
The loss to optimize Dis(·) is computed as:
LDdis = −
1
m
m∑
i=1
∑
j∈{a,b}
[log(Dis(Y
(i)
j × I
(i)
j ))
+ log(1− Dis(Ŷ
(i)
j × I
(i)
j ))]
(14)
Because the discriminative network is constructed based on
spectral normalization [52] in which the hinge loss shows bet-
ter performance, we also test the performance of the algorithm
with the hinge loss. The formulated hinge loss for DMAC(·)
is given by:
LGdis = −
1
m
m∑
i=1
∑
j∈{a,b}
Dis(Ŷ
(i)
j × I
(i)
j ) (15)
and the Dis(·) loss is:
LDdis =−
1
m
m∑
i=1
∑
j∈{a,b}
[min(0,−1 + Dis(Y
(i)
j ×
I
(i)
j )) + min(0,−1−Dis(Ŷ
(i)
j × I
(i)
j ))]
(16)
Consequently, the proposed adversarial learning framework
of DMAC(·) can be summarized as Algorithm 2.
E. Detection Network and Discriminative Network
In this section, we present the architectures of the detection
network Det(·) and the discriminative network Dis(·). In fact,
Det(·) can be treated as a kind of Siamese Network [53], the
weights and parameters for feature extraction are shared for the
two inputs (refer to formula (11) and (12)). As shown in Fig.
5 (a), the feature extraction block consists of four consecutive
convolutional layers, batch normalization layers and ReLU
layers. Two maxpool layers are adopted to downsample the
feature maps and improve the invariance of features. As shown
in the purple block, element-wise subtraction is conducted
between the two flattened features, and their absolute values
constitute the new feature. Finally, two fully connected layers
are designed to generate the correlation score.
In the discriminative network Dis(·), we adopt the spectral
normalization to stabilize the training of the network. The
spectral normalization technique is computationally light and
easy to incorporate into existing implementations, showing
good performance both in the original work [52] and our
experiments. As shown in Fig. 5 (b), four convolutional layers
and one fully connected layer with corresponding spectral
normalization are constructed. LeakyReLU [54] is adopted
Algorithm 2: Adversarial learning on DMAC(·)
Input: Pretrained DMAC(·) based on Lce
1: for number of training iterations do
2: for k steps do
3: Sample minibatch of m pairs of investigated
images {I
(i)
a−ori, I
(i)
b−ori|i = 1, · · ·m} with labeled
masks {Y
(i)
a , Y
(i)
b |i = 1, · · ·m}
4: Compute generated masks Ŷ
(i)
a , Ŷ
(i)
b by DMAC(·)
5: Update the detection network Det(·) by descend-
ing its stochastic gradient ∇LDdet
6: Update the discriminative network Dis(·) by
descending its stochastic gradient ∇LDdis
7: end for
8: Sample minibatch of m pairs of investigated
images {I
(i)
a−ori, I
(i)
b−ori|i = 1, · · ·m} with labeled
masks {Y
(i)
a , Y
(i)
b |i = 1, · · ·m}
9: Compute generated masks Ŷ
(i)
a , Ŷ
(i)
b by DMAC(·)
10: Update DMAC(·) by descending its stochastic
gradient ∇Ldmac
11: end for
Output: Optimized DMAC(·)
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Input dim: 3 Output dim: 16
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Batch Normalization
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Fig. 5. Architectures of the detection network Det(·) and the discriminative
network Dis(·).
8as the activation layer. In addition, two maxpool layers are
adopted. Note that for the binary cross entropy loss, the
network in Fig. 5 (b) is followed by a Sigmoid layer, while
the hinge loss directly utilizes the output of this network.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Training Data Preparation
In our supervised training, an enormous number of training
pairs with accurate ground truth masks are needed. However,
there is no available image forensics dataset satisfying the
requirements. Thus, we leverage the MS COCO dataset [55]
with instance segments to automatically generate the synthetic
images. MS COCO is originally designed for object detection
[56], semantic segmentation [32], etc. It provides abundant
images with object annotations, and consists of 82783 training
images and 40504 testing images (2014 version).
In our work, all the images are resized into 256× 256 for
suiting the input of the network and controlling the transforma-
tion variables. For each training image, we randomly select one
of the annotated regions under different transformations which
will be pasted into another randomly selected training image.
Thus, we could harvest three (two positive and one negative)
training pairs as shown in Fig. 1. As for the transformation,
five types of transformations are adopted, i.e. shift, rotation,
scale, luminance, deformation changes. Specifically, all the
pasted regions are under the shift change in U(−127, 127).
For other types of transformations, it has a 50% probability of
suffering each transformation. In another words, the synthetic
image may suffer several kinds of transformations. The rota-
tion changes are in the range of U(−30, 30), scale changes
are in U(0.5, 4), luminance changes are in U(−32, 32), and
deformation changes are in U(0.5, 2) (decrease or increase
the width of the tampered region). Furthermore, the selected
regions must satisfy the basic needs that their areas should
be larger than 1% of the images and smaller than 50%,
because extremely small regions are too difficult to detect and
excessively large regions are meaningless. According to the
ratios of the pasted areas, the training pairs are divided into
three groups, namely Difficult (larger than 1% and smaller
than 10%), Normal (larger than 10% and smaller than 25%),
and Easy (larger than 25% and smaller than 50%). Because the
images in MS COCO have more than one annotated regions,
we traversed five times on the training set and generated
1, 035, 255 training pairs with 1/3 foreground pairs (as shown
in the top row of Fig. 1), 1/3 background pairs (the middle
row of Fig. 1) and 1/3 negative pairs (the bottom of Fig. 1).
As for the testing pairs generation, we follow the same
strategies as the training set. We mainly test the localization
performance on the foreground pairs for that the background
pairs are the extremely simple cases without any transforma-
tions (it can be clearly seen from the middle row of Fig. 1).
The testing pairs are also divided into the Difficult, Normal
and Easy groups to testify the capabilities of detecting small
regions and accurate boundaries. Besides of the testing pairs
under several transformations, we further generate different
groups of image pairs under a single kind of transformation,
to test the robustness against the specific transformation, which
will be discussed in the experimental comparisons.
B. Implementation and Evaluation Details
Implementation details. All the proposed networks and
corresponding training/testing scripts are implemented based
on the deep learning framework of PyTorch. The proposed
DMAC network firstly is trained with the single spatial cross
entropy loss of formula (9). As above-described, there are
1, 035, 255 training pairs, and we conduct 3 epochs of training
until converging. In this pre-training procedure, the Adadelta
optimizer [57] is adopted with default settings of PyTorch.
Then we adopt the proposed adversarial learning framework
as described in Algorithm 2 to optimize the pretrained DMAC
network. We conduct 1 epoch of training and adopt the Adam
optimizer which is prevalently used in GANs [52]. The step
k in Algorithm 2 is set to 1, and the learning rates of the
detection and discriminative networks are all set to 0.0002.
The selection of DMAC learning rates and corresponding loss
weights will be discussed in the following experiments.
Evaluation datasets. The proposed method is evaluated on
three groups of datasets:
• The generated datasets: We generate several different sets
to thoroughly testify the proposed method: (1) The Combina-
tion sets, in which the tampered regions are under several kinds
of transformations as described in the previous subsection; (2)
The Raw sets, in which the regions are directly pasted to the
same positions; (3) Shift sets; (4) Rotation sets; (5) Scale
sets; (6) Luminance sets; (7) Deformation sets. In sets (3)-
(6), the tampered regions are under the single transformation.
All the sets are further divided into three subsets according
to the proportions of the tampered areas, namely Difficult,
Normal, Easy sets, which have been described in the previous
subsection. There are 3000 image pairs in each subset, and
there are 63, 000 generated testing image pairs in total.
• The paired CASIA dataset: In [1], they generated 3642
positive samples by pairing the 1821 spliced images in CASIA
TIDEv2.0 dataset [14] with their true donor images, and
collected 5000 negative samples by randomly pairing 7491
color images from the same CASIA-defined content category.
This dataset is only adopted for the detection evaluation for
the lack of ground truth masks.
• The MFC2018 datasets: Media forensics challenge 2018
[12] provides the latest evaluation dataset, i.e., MFC2018 Eval
Part1 Ver1, in which there are 1327 positive image pairs and
16, 673 negative pairs, and they also provide scoring codes
which can measure the global detection scores.
Evaluation metrics. For the evaluation of localization
performance, we adopt the pixel-level IoU (Intersection over
Union), MCC (Matthews Correlation Coefficient), NMM
(Nimble Mask Metric). IoU is commonly used in semantic
segmentation and object detection [56], and here we only
evaluate the IoU scores of the tampered regions. MCC and
NMM are adopted for evaluating the localization performance
of each single probe image in the Media forensics challenge
[12]. Here, we all compute the average IoU, MCC and NMM
of all the tested image pairs. As for the detection performance,
the precision, recall, F1-score [1], AUC (Area Under Curve)
and EER (Equal Error Rate) [12] are adopted.
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(c) Evaluations on Easy set
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Fig. 6. The IoU, MCC and NMM scores across training iterations on the
Combination sets. The results of DMVN act as the baselines, and are generated
by the model and codes provided by its original work.
Growing trends analyses. As aforementioned, the DMAC
network is pretrained on the generated training pairs using
the single spatial cross entropy loss. Since 3-epoch training is
conducted and the batch size is set to 24, more than 129, 000
iterations are conducted and the scores growing trends are
shown in Fig. 6. The results of DMVN are generated by the
codes provided by the authors [1]. It can be seen that the
proposed DMAC can surpass DMVN after 20, 000 iterations,
and can achieve constant higher scores than DMVN on all
the sets. On the Normal and Easy sets, DMAC converges on
a high level of scores in the last epoch, while the scores
of the Difficult set remain range-bound on a lower level.
So that it is still a difficult task to detect and localize the
small matching regions. However, with the help of our atrous
convolution operations and skip architectures, richer spatial
information can be exploited, resulting in a performance leap
on the Difficult set than DMVN. Using IoU scores as the
example, the IoU score of DMAC rises by 0.2342 to 0.5114
on the Difficult set, while the IoU scores rise by 0.1461/0.1024
on the Normal/Easy sets.
Hyper parameters analyses. After 3-epoch training,
DMAC converges and achieves constant better performance
than DMVN. Then, as described in Algorithm 2, adversarial
learning is conducted to optimize the pretrained DMAC net-
work. In formula (8), the detection loss weight λdet and dis-
criminative loss weight λdis are not decided, the learning rate
(LR) of DMAC in the optimizing procedure is not fixed. Thus,
a small grid search is conducted to find the optimized hyper
parameters. To demonstrate the necessity and effectiveness of
the proposed adversarial learning framework, we also conduct
1-epoch training based on the single spatial cross entropy loss
via Adam optimizer with LR of 10−5, which is denoted as
DMAC⋆. As shown in Table I, there is no obvious gap between
DMAC and DMAC⋆. Then the grid search is conducted
with two different discriminative losses (formula (13)(14) and
formula (15)(16) respectively). It can be seen that the DMAC
models can achieve better performance when λdet and λdis are
both set to 0.01. Smaller or higher weights will lead to slight
decay on the majority of scores. When LR is set to 10−5, the
model can get higher scores. According to our observation,
the DMAC with binary cross entropy loss (DMAC+adv-bce)
can achieve slightly better performance than the hinge loss
(DMAC+adv-hin) under different hyper parameters. The hinge
loss tends to more intensively suppress vague areas, resulting
in miss detection. Thus, we finally choose DMAC+adv-bce
with λdet, λdis = 0.01 and LR = 10
−5 as our selected
adversarial learning based DMAC network which is denoted
as DMAC-adv.
Moreover, the decrease or increase of either λdet or λdis can
lead to the drop of scores, which can also demonstrate that
both the detection and discriminative losses have important
effects on the optimization performance. To validate this obser-
vation, we further conduct four tests, i.e., DMAC+adv-bce and
DMAC+adv-hin with λdet = 0 and λdis = 0.01, DMAC+det,
DMAC+det-adv. DMAC+det denotes that the DMAC network
is optimized by the single detection network without the su-
pervision of the ground-truth masks. DMAC+det-adv denotes
the version of the proposed adversarial learning framework in
which λdis is set to 0 and λdet is set to 0.01. As shown in Table
I, it shows that both the detection network and the discrimina-
tive network have positive effects on the improvement of the
DMAC localization performance. The discriminative network
plays a more important role for optimizing the localization
performance. The adversarial variant of the detection network,
i.e. DMAC+det-adv, can slightly improve the DMAC’s perfor-
mance, while DMAC+det looks a little feeble. In summary, the
hybrid multi-task loss of our adversarial learning framework
can achieve better performance.
Invariance analyses. The invariance to different transfor-
mations is testified on six groups of testing sets. As shown
in Table II, we first test DMVN, DMAC and DMAC-adv
on the Raw sets. All those models can achieve significant
higher scores than the results on the Combination sets, and we
treat the scores as the baselines. It shows that the localization
scores of DMVN on the Rotation, Scale and Deformation sets
apparently decline. While the proposed DMAC and DMAC-
adv can achieve constant better performance than DMVN, and
their scores only distinctly drop on the Scale sets. For example,
DMAC and DMAC-adv can achieve IoU scores higher than
0.6 on all the difficult sets except for the Scale set. Thus,
it can be testified all those models are sensitive to the scale
change. Nonetheless, DMAC-adv can achieve higher scores
than DMVN and DMAC in the great majority of cases.
Complexity analyses. As reported by the original codes of
[1], the trainable parameters number of DMVN is 10, 473, 788.
The trainable parameters number of DMAC is 14, 920, 520.
The parameters rise of DMAC is mainly caused by the
increased channels of correlation maps and multi-scale op-
erations of ASPP. However, the average computing time of
DMVN is 0.2947 second, and our DMAC takes 0.0288 second
per image pair which is much more efficient than DMVN. All
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TABLE I
HYPER PARAMETERS ANALYSES AND COMPARISONS ON THE COMBINATION SETS
Method
Difficult Normal Easy Parameters
IoU MCC NMM IoU MCC NMM IoU MCC NMM λdet λdis LR
DMVN 0.2772 0.4550 -0.4382 0.6818 0.7570 0.4042 0.8198 0.8544 0.6770 - - -
DMAC 0.5114 0.6308 0.0335 0.8279 0.8815 0.6840 0.9222 0.9395 0.8685 - - -
DMAC⋆ 0.5146 0.6359 0.0365 0.8264 0.8801 0.6710 0.9246 0.9420 0.8643 0 0 10−5
DMAC
+
adv-bce
0.5292 0.6436 0.0823 0.8252 0.8777 0.6844 0.9184 0.9367 0.8620 0.1 0.1 10−5
0.5376 0.6546 0.0903 0.8305 0.8819 0.6861 0.9236 0.9410 0.8663 0.1 0.01 10−5
0.5433 0.6584 0.1026 0.8317 0.8833 0.6877 0.9237 0.9411 0.8655 0.01 0.01 10−5
0.5308 0.6492 0.0722 0.8303 0.8827 0.6812 0.9248 0.9421 0.8655 0.01 0.001 10−5
0.5235 0.6410 0.0577 0.8293 0.8817 0.6787 0.9246 0.9419 0.8649 0.001 0.001 10−5
0.5264 0.6430 0.0654 0.8213 0.8751 0.6685 0.9163 0.9352 0.8524 0.01 0.01 10−4
0.5265 0.6431 0.0675 0.8290 0.8804 0.6834 0.9236 0.9409 0.8671 0.01 0.01 10−6
0.5413 0.6556 0.0987 0.8301 0.8822 0.6838 0.9228 0.9403 0.8631 0 0.01 10−5
DMAC
+
adv-hin
0.5222 0.6376 0.0688 0.8216 0.8749 0.6764 0.9151 0.9342 0.8547 0.1 0.1 10−5
0.5333 0.6501 0.0812 0.8303 0.8818 0.6857 0.9237 0.9410 0.8666 0.1 0.01 10−5
0.5392 0.6525 0.0957 0.8313 0.8825 0.6878 0.9245 0.9416 0.8682 0.01 0.01 10−5
0.5292 0.6479 0.0683 0.8305 0.8829 0.6814 0.9254 0.9424 0.8669 0.01 0.001 10−5
0.5255 0.6421 0.0619 0.8290 0.8818 0.6784 0.9236 0.9410 0.8633 0.001 0.001 10−5
0.5333 0.6503 0.0779 0.8222 0.8774 0.6702 0.9151 0.9341 0.8506 0.01 0.01 10−4
0.5181 0.6338 0.0505 0.8271 0.8788 0.6796 0.9222 0.9397 0.8647 0.01 0.01 10−6
0.5361 0.6504 0.0879 0.8305 0.8822 0.6846 0.9235 0.9409 0.8647 0 0.01 10−5
DMAC+det 0.5160 0.6363 0.0403 0.8252 0.8793 0.6689 0.9225 0.9402 0.8602 0.01 0 10−5
DMAC+adv-det 0.5226 0.6415 0.0549 0.8293 0.8821 0.6787 0.9247 0.9419 0.8655 0.01 0 10−5
TABLE II
INVARIANCE ANALYSES
Method Transformation
Difficult Normal Easy
IoU MCC NMM IoU MCC NMM IoU MCC NMM
DMVN
Raw
0.5886 0.6962 0.2168 0.8547 0.9056 0.7838 0.9126 0.9297 0.8814
DMAC 0.6771 0.7862 0.3841 0.8895 0.9299 0.8202 0.9306 0.9447 0.8973
DMAC-adv 0.6923 0.7989 0.4165 0.8929 0.9324 0.8197 0.9351 0.9487 0.8973
DMVN
Shift
0.5288 0.6324 0.0843 0.8507 0.9026 0.7666 0.9138 0.9305 0.8754
DMAC 0.6332 0.7450 0.2878 0.8880 0.9289 0.8144 0.9329 0.9466 0.8961
DMAC-adv 0.6517 0.7607 0.3289 0.8899 0.9304 0.8109 0.9348 0.9486 0.8920
DMVN
Rotation
0.4751 0.5763 -0.0292 0.7731 0.8410 0.5986 0.8414 0.8701 0.7276
DMAC 0.6213 0.7360 0.2620 0.8631 0.9119 0.7618 0.9203 0.9369 0.8734
DMAC-adv 0.6408 0.7529 0.3023 0.8693 0.9165 0.7679 0.9254 0.9414 0.8753
DMVN
Scale
0.3250 0.4114 -0.3464 0.6758 0.7333 0.3965 0.8952 0.9159 0.8324
DMAC 0.4326 0.5460 -0.1299 0.7308 0.7956 0.4882 0.9153 0.9331 0.8558
DMAC-adv 0.4451 0.5559 -0.1002 0.7327 0.7954 0.4882 0.9158 0.9340 0.8498
DMVN
Luminance
0.5737 0.6814 0.1839 0.8485 0.9008 0.7671 0.9086 0.9263 0.8700
DMAC 0.6582 0.7706 0.3436 0.8805 0.9237 0.7998 0.9263 0.9412 0.8864
DMAC-adv 0.6751 0.7852 0.3789 0.8831 0.9257 0.7979 0.9298 0.9446 0.8850
DMVN
Deformation
0.4813 0.5906 -0.0177 0.8189 0.8815 0.6979 0.8912 0.9143 0.8289
DMAC 0.6045 0.7279 0.2262 0.8628 0.9130 0.7606 0.9162 0.9350 0.8602
DMAC-adv 0.6258 0.7454 0.2733 0.8655 0.9152 0.7597 0.9180 0.9368 0.8564
the experiments are conducted on a machine with Intel(R)
Core(TM) i7-5930K CPU @ 3.50GHz, 64GB RAM and a
single GPU (TITAN X). We directly adopt the codes and
models provided by the original work of DMVN [1] which
is implemented based on Keras and Theano, and ours is
implemented on PyTorch.
D. Comparisons on CASIA and MFC2018
To testify the generalization ability and robustness of our
DMAC network and the adversarial learning framework, ex-
periments are further conducted on the paired CASIA dataset
and the MFC2018 dataset, which have no intersection with the
generated image pairs.
Comparisons on CASIA. Detection scores are presented
in Table III, in which the scores of the compared methods are
borrowed from [1]. The tampered probabilities of DMAC and
DMAC-adv are computed as the average scores of the detected
tampered regions. Specifically, for each generated mask, we
compute the average score {si|i = a, b} of the pixels whose
scores are larger than 0.5, and the final tampered probability
is the mean value (sa + sb)/2 of the two generated masks. It
can be seen that DMAC can achieve significant higher scores
than DMVN and other compared copy-move forgery detection
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Fig. 7. Visual comparisons on the paired CASIA dataset.
methods. With the help of adversarial learning, the precision
rises by 0.0402 to 0.9657 while the recall slightly falls by
0.0092 to 0.8576. The F1-score of DMAC-adv is also higher
than DMAC. The visual comparisons are provided in Fig. 7. It
can be seen that DMAC can achieve better performance under
deformation, scale or flip changes, and the adversarial learning
procedure can suppress the vague regions and optimize the
detection boundaries, resulting in the rise of precision and
slightly decay of recall.
According to [1], we also compare our detection network
under adversarial training (DMAC-adv-det) and optimized
detection network (DMAC-adv-det†). As for DMAC-adv-det†,
it is optimized from DMAC-adv-det on the pure generated
masks with the fixed DMAC network. The Adam optimizer is
adopted for 1-epoch optimization, and the learning rate is set
to 10−5. It can be seen that their recall and AUC scores are
higher than DMAC and DMAC-adv, while the F1-scores are
higher than DMAC and lower than DMAC-adv. The precision
scores are on the same level with the DMAC.
Comparisons on MFC2018. The comparisons are con-
ducted between DMVN and DMAC on the MFC2018 dataset.
The AUC and EER scores in Table IV are computed by the
Fig. 8. Visual comparisons on the MFC2018 dataset.
TABLE III
COMPARISONS ON CASIA
Method Precision Recall F1-score AUC
[21] 0.5164 0.8292 0.6364 0.8097
[58] 0.9969 0.5353 0.6966 0.7677
[59] 0.9614 0.5895 0.7309 0.7909
[25] 0.9897 0.6334 0.7725 0.8157
DMVN-loc 0.9152 0.7918 0.8491 0.9052
DMVN-det 0.9415 0.7908 0.8596 0.9244
DMAC 0.9255 0.8668 0.8952 0.9468
DMAC-adv 0.9657 0.8576 0.9085 0.9472
DMAC-adv-det 0.9234 0.8846 0.9036 0.9512
DMAC-adv-det† 0.9279 0.8838 0.9053 0.9556
evaluation codes provided by the MFC2018 challenge [12].
The corresponding visual comparisons are provided in Fig. 8.
It can be seen that DMAC, DMAC-adv and the detection net-
work indeed can achieve better performance than DMVN-loc
and DMVN-det. As shown in Fig. 8, DMAC-adv can provide
more accurate boundaries and more clear judgement for each
pixel. Compared with DMAC, the probability distributions of
12
TABLE IV
COMPARISONS ON MFC2018
Method AUC EER
DMVN-loc 0.6584 0.4000
DMVN-det 0.6970 0.3665
DMAC 0.7542 0.3123
DMAC-adv 0.7511 0.3093
DMAC-adv-det 0.7518 0.3135
DMAC-adv-det† 0.7536 0.3127
the masks generated by DMAC-adv are closer to the ground-
truth masks, with less vague scores.
Synthesizing the results on CASIA and MFC2018, we
recommend DMAC-adv for both the localization task and the
detection task, for its accurate localization performance, low
error rates and high efficiency. Although, the recall of DMAC-
adv is lower than DMAC, DMAC-adv-det and DMAC-adv-
det†, DMAC-adv has the lowest error rate. For the paired
CASIA dataset, there are 3642 positive pairs and 5000 negative
pairs, the higher error rates of DMAC and the detection branch
are reluctantly acceptable. For MFC2018 which is more simi-
lar to real applications, the higher error rates will result in an
abundance of false alarmed samples. So that, the AUC scores
of DMAC-adv-det and DMAC-adv-det† are higher on CASIA,
while there is no advantage on MFC2018. As for DMAC-adv
on MFC2018, its AUC score falls by 0.0031 than DMAC,
while the EER of DMAC-adv is the smallest. Considering
the accurate localization performance and definitely higher
scores on CASIA, DMAC-adv is more competent than DMAC.
Furthermore, DMAC-adv-det and DMAC-adv-det† need the
additional computation of the detection network, DMAC-adv
simultaneously gets the localization and detection results, and
is more efficient.
V. CONCLUSION
To cope with the CISDL task, a novel adversarial learning
framework is proposed, and there are three building blocks,
namely the DMAC network, the detection network and the
discriminative network. In the DMAC network, atrous con-
volution, the skip architecture and ASPP are designed and
assembled to enhance its abilities to detect small matching
regions and multi-scale regions. Then, we creatively construct
the detection network and the discriminative network as the
losses of DMAC with auxiliary parameters, and optimize them
in an adversarial way. Extensive experiments are conducted on
both generated datasets and publicly available datasets, and the
experimental results demonstrate the appealing performance of
the proposed adversarial learning framework and the DMAC
network. Although significant improvements are made by
proposing DMAC and the adversarial learning framework, the
techniques to detect small tampered regions and regions under
huge changes still need further research.
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